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Euro-Mediterranean 
relations  and  the  Arab 
Spring 
 
Summary 
 
This background paper begins with a reflection on Euro-
Mediterranean relations from the 1970s to the launch 
of the Union for the Mediterranean initiative in 2008. 
Many  analysts  believe  that  the  recent  events  in  the 
Middle East / North Africa (popularly referred to as the 
Arab  Spring)  is  a  test  for  the  future  of  Euro-
Mediterranean relations. Some scholars have even gone 
as far as to suggest that the unfolding of these events, 
in which the EU was caught unprepared, reflect a failure 
of  the  EU’s  neighbourhood  policy  in  promoting 
democracy  and  human  rights.    As  the  countries  in 
Middle  East  and  North  Africa  undergo  difficult 
transitions  toward  democracy,  it  is  time  that  the  EU 
reflects  on  its  policy  and  rethinks  its  approach  in 
engaging that region. The paper concludes with some 
reflections  on  the  EU’s  longer  term  concerns  and 
interests in the region, and consequences of the Arab 
Spring on the EU-Mediterranean partnership.    2 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Europe  and  the  southern/eastern 
Mediterranean  region  are  historically  and 
geographically connected. A growing number 
of  citizens  and  immigrants  in  the  European 
Union  (EU)  trace  their  origins  to  these 
countries (Moussis 2009). The EU has a long-
standing  relationship  with  many  of  these 
countries  to  the  south  and  east  of  the 
Mediterranean  Sea.  This  background  brief 
provides  a  broad  overview  of  the  EU’s 
approach  towards  its  Southern  and  Eastern 
Mediterranean  neighbours  and  considers 
some of the implications that developments 
unfolding in the region could have on the EU’s 
policy going forward.   
 
After  the  public  self-immolation  of  the 
Tunisian  street  vendor  Mohammed  Bouazizi 
on  17  December  2010,  unrest  spread  from 
Tunisia to Egypt, Yemen, Libya and Syria, and 
there  have  been  also  pockets  of  unrest  in 
Bahrain  and  various  Gulf  states.  Popular 
protests  in  Tunisia  and  Egypt  have 
unexpectedly  overthrown  the  long-standing 
regimes of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali 
and  President  Hosni  Mubarak,  but  in  Syria, 
Yemen,  the  protests  are  ongoing  with  no 
signs of abating, with the likelihood of more 
bloodshed.  
The EU is currently struggling to respond to 
these historic yet complex developments. The 
dilemma  underlying  current  EU  policies 
towards  these  countries  was  recently 
expressed  by  President  of  the  European 
Council, Herman van Rompuy, who said that 
‘it was a difficult choice between defending 
our  values  such  as  human  rights  and  our 
interests, such as stability in the Middle East’.
 
To provide a better insight into this quandary, 
this  paper  will  investigate  the  extent  and 
areas in which the Arab Spring will have an 
impact  on  the  EU’s  relations  with  its 
neighbours  in  the  Southern  and  Eastern 
Mediterranean region.  
Since  its  earlier  days  as  the  European 
Economic Community (EEC), the EU has tried 
to  find  a  common  platform  to  engage  the 
countries in this region - from the 1972 Global 
Mediterranean  Policy  to  the  Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership of the 1990s and 
the  ambitious  Union  for  the  Mediterranean 
proposed  by  French  President  Nicholas 
Sarkozy  in  2007.  The  configuration  of 
countries  making  up  the  so-called 
‘Mediterranean partners’ of the EU, has also 
changed  over  the  years.  The  EEC’s  Global 
Mediterranean Policy (GMP) for instance, was 
open to all states around the Mediterranean.
1 
However, in the 1980s, several of the states 
that were in the Global Mediterranean Policy 
–  Greece,  Portugal  and  Spain  –  joined  the 
European  Community.  The  configuration  of 
EU’s  Mediterranean  partners  shifted  again 
when  the  EU  launched  the  new  Euro-
Mediterranean  partnership  (also  known  as 
the  Barcelona  Process)  in  1995.  The  Balkan 
countries (making up the former Yugoslavia) 
that  used  to  be  considered  as  part  of  the 
Mediterranean  were  now  referred  to  as 
Eastern  European  countries  and  the 
relationship with them moved to be part of 
the broader European Neighbourhood Policy. 
The Barcelona Process also included countries 
from North Africa and the Middle East but not 
Libya, which was then under United Nations 
(UN) sanctions, and hence not invited by the 
EU to participate in the Barcelona Process. 
 
With the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), 
membership  broadened  to  include  Libya, 
                                                      
1 The  GMP  covered  the  following  states:  Albania,  Algeria, 
Cyprus,  Egypt,  Greece,  Israel,  Lebanon,  Libya,  Malta, 
Morocco,  Portugal,  Spain,  Syria,  Tunisia,  Turkey  and 
Yugoslavia.  
Euro-Mediterranean relations and the Arab Spring  4 
some of the Balkan countries and Albania and 
Mauritania, which had already requested for 
partnership  under  the  Barcelona  Process. 
What constitutes the ‘Mediterranean region’ 
has therefore seemed to be defined by the EU 
according  to  its  shifting  interests  and 
priorities (Cardwell 2011: 224-230).  
 
The paper comprises three sections. The first 
section  traces  the  EU’s  (with  its  earlier 
incarnation  as  the  EEC)  relations  with  the 
various countries on the southern and eastern 
Mediterranean  from  the  1970s.  Security, 
Israeli-Arab  relations,  energy  and 
development  have  always  been  the  factors 
shaping the ‘tenet’ of the relationship.  The 
EU’s approach to these countries has shifted 
over the years, from the enthusiastic pursuit 
of  inter-regional  dialogue  in  the  1970s  to  a 
more  nuanced  mix  of  bilateralism  and 
regionalism  in  recent  years.  The  EU’s  policy 
has also wavered between a more idealistic 
desire  to  promote  democracy  and  human 
rights  in  the  region,  particularly  in  the  first 
decade  of  the  post-Cold  War  era,  to  a 
pragmatic pursuit of economic interests and 
its broader concern for political stability in the 
region.  
 
The second section briefly discusses some of 
the causes of the Arab Spring, and attempts 
to  answer the  issue  of whether  the  EU  has 
played any role in the changes taking place in 
the countries ranging from Tunisia, Egypt to 
Syria and Yemen. The perception that the EU 
was  caught  unprepared  for  the  wave  of 
protests in several of these countries that are 
partners in the EU-Mediterranean partnership 
gave  rise  to  questions  about  possible 
shortcomings  on  the  part  of  the  EU  in  its 
engagement of the region.  
 
The consequences of the Arab Spring on the 
future  of  EU-Mediterranean  relations  are 
addressed  in  the  third  section.  This  section 
discusses the EU’s search for a way forward to 
support  democratic  reform  in  the  southern 
and  eastern  Mediterranean  region,  while  at 
the  same  time  being  mindful  of  the 
complexities arising from the Israel-Palestine 
conflict,  the  role  of  political  Islam  and  the 
sensitive issue of migration flows to the EU. 
The Lisbon Treaty which aims to make the EU 
a  more  coherent  and  effective  global  actor 
has  come  into  force  generating  further 
expectation  of  the  EU  with  its  European 
External  Action  Service  (EEAS)  to  respond 
more  coherently  to  developments  in  this 
neighbourhood. The paper concludes with the 
observation that it remains to be seen if the 
new ‘Partnership for Democracy and Shared 
Prosperity’  proposed  by  the  EU  will  ensure 
the  best  outcome  for  the  EU  and  its 
Southern/Eastern Mediterranean neighbours.  
 
The  research  for  this  background  brief  has 
been  supplemented  by  interviews  with 
journalists, researchers and policy makers.  
 
 
2.  EU-Mediterranean relations before 
the Arab Spring 
 
In 1958, when the Treaty of Rome came into 
force,  six  European  countries  –  West 
Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands – founding members of 
the  European  Coal  and  Steel  Community 
(ECSC)  became  the  European  Economic 
Community  (EEC).  The  establishment  of  the 
EEC, which created a customs union among 
these states, posed, among some questions, 
how  to  maintain  mutually  beneficial 
economic relations  with  their  neighbours to 
the  south  of  the  Mediterranean.    The 
discussion  of  relations  with  the  southern 
neighbours  became  more  pressing  with  the 
impending accession of the United Kingdom 
(UK)  to  the  EEC.  The  UK  had  maintained  a 
much  more  liberal  policy  with  regard  to 
imports  from  the  non-European 
Mediterranean countries before it applied to 
become a member of the EEC. Joining the EEC 
meant that the UK would have to adopt the  5 
common  external  tariff  which  was  much 
higher  than  its  own.  Many  exporters, 
including  non-European  Mediterranean 
countries would lose the easier and cheaper 
access to the UK market. Hence the question 
arose as to whether the EEC should impose a 
common  tariff  for  all  its  neighbouring 
Southern  Mediterranean  countries  or 
negotiate  different  tariffs  for  the  different 
countries in the region on a bilateral basis.  
 
The Global Mediterranean Policy 
 
The first institution which suggested a unitary 
approach to the Mediterranean countries was 
the European Parliament. It was in the Rossi 
Report  (1972)
2   that  the  idea  of  ‘regional 
promotion policy’ was proposed.  
 
The  EEC  regional  strategy  towards  its 
southern  Mediterranean  neighbours  started 
with the GMP between 1972 and 1991. With 
the  GMP,  the  EEC  signalled  that  it  saw  the 
Mediterranean as a sufficiently homogenous 
region to warrant a common approach. The 
GMP consisted of a series of almost identical 
bilateral  agreements  between  the  EEC  and 
the  various  Mediterranean  countries  but 
without  an  overarching  multilateral 
framework  (Bicchi  2011:  8).  These  bilateral 
agreements mainly focused on trade, financial 
and  technical  issues.  The  GMP  granted  the 
EEC’s Mediterranean partners free access to 
the  European  common  market  for  their 
industrial  products.    However,  this  did  not 
lead  to  any  significant  increase  in  trade 
because  of  the  mismatch  between  the 
economies of scale approach of the GMP and 
the import-substitution strategy of the EEC’s 
Mediterranean partners. In other words, the 
GMP  offered  a  new  approach  that  created 
economic  interdependence,  while  the 
                                                      
2 European  Parliament  working  documents  302/72  (1972-
1973).  Report  drawn  up  on  behalf  of  the  Committee  on 
External  Economic  Relations  on  the  consequences  of  the 
enlargement  of  the  European  Community  for  its  relations 
with the Mediterranean countries.  
Mediterranean partners (especially the Arab 
countries)  were  trying  to  pursue  what  they 
believed  was  economic  independence 
through  an  import  substitution  strategy.  
While the GMP did not seem to be of much 
economic significance, it had the unintended 
consequence of contributing to a shift in the 
European  approach towards  the  Israeli-Arab 
conflict  in  which the  EEC  acknowledged the 
Palestinians’ right to self-government and the 
right  of  the  Palestinian  Liberation 
Organization  (PLO)  to  be  involved  in  any 
peace initiatives.  
 
This period of active engagement in the 1970s 
was  followed  by  a  period  of  neglect  in  the 
1980s  because  of  the  EEC’s  southern 
enlargement  –  Greece  became  an  EEC 
member  in  1981  and  Spain  and  Portugal  in 
1986.  Because  there  were  similarities 
between  their  economies  and  those  of  the 
EEC’s southern Mediterranean partners in the 
agricultural  and  industrial  sector,  the  latter 
lost  trade  revenue  because  trade  was 
diverted to the new EEC member states. With 
this  enlargement  the  EEC  also  became  self-
sufficient  in  many  of  the  Mediterranean 
products  such  as  olive  oil  and  tomatoes. 
Therefore the non-EEC Mediterranean states 
became less important for the EEC, and the 
economic  gap  between  the  EEC  and  its 
partners widened (Bicchi 2009).  
 
The EEC became the EU when the Treaty of 
the  European  Union  (also  known  as 
Maastricht Treaty) entered into force in 1993. 
The end of the Cold War also brought about 
renewed  activism  on  the  part  of  the  EU  to 
engage its eastern and southern neighbours.  
For its southern neighbours, the EU launched 
what  it  termed  as  the  Renewed 
Mediterranean  Policy  (RMP)  of  1991-1995. 
The RMP increased the funds committed by 
the  EU  for  the  Mediterranean  region  and 
distributed  funds  through  public-private 
cooperation, more decentralised partnership 
and the promotion of multilateral networks.  6 
Moreover,  cooperation  extended  to  issues 
relating  to  human  rights,  the  environment 
and the promotion of democracy (European 
Commission  1989).  However  the  RMP 
suffered from a gap between the policy goals 
and  the  actual  efforts  made  by  the  EU 
member states in this partnership. The RMP 
did not bring about any significant economic 
developments or major economic reforms in 
the  southern  and  eastern  Mediterranean 
region to close the structural gaps between 
the  European  and  the  neighbouring 
Mediterranean  economies.  Nevertheless  the 
RMP  ensured  that  EU-Mediterranean 
partnership stayed on the agenda of the EU at 
a time of great international transitions and 
tumultuous  changes  taking  place  in  Central 
and Eastern Europe (Gomez 2003).   
 
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: the 
Barcelona Process 
 
At a time of optimism brought about by the 
Oslo  Accords  (signed  in  1993),
3 the  Euro-
Mediterranean  Partnership  (EMP)  wa s 
launched.  This  was  the  first  multilateral 
framework for cooperation between the EU 
and the southern and eastern Mediterranean 
region.  At  the  Barcelona  conference  in 
November 1995, the EMP was formalised into 
the Barcelona Process based on the principles 
of joint ownership, dialogue and co-operation 
and the motivation to create a Mediterranean 
region  of  peace,  security  and  shared 
prosperity. At the conference, 27 countries 
adopted  the  Barcelona  declaration.
4  The 
objectives of the cooperation can be divided  
into three sub-areas: 
                                                      
3  These  agreements  were  an  attempt  to  resolve  the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It was the first direct agreement 
between  the  government  of  Israel  and  the  Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO). 
 
4 The  Euro-Med  partners  in  1995  were   Austria,  Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the 
United  Kingdom,  Algeria,  Cyprus,  Egypt,  Israel,  Jordan, 
Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, 
Tunisia and Turkey. 
  political and security aspects with the 
aim to create a common area of peace 
and stability; 
  economic  and  financial  aspects  to 
promote  shared  economic 
opportunity  through  sustainable 
socio-economic development; and 
  Social  and  cultural  aspects  with  the 
aim  to  promote  understanding  and 
intercultural  dialogue  between 
cultures.
5   
 
One  of  the  ambitions  of  the  B arcelona 
Process was the goal to  create a free trade 
area between EU and its southern / eastern 
Mediterranean partners. Between 199 8 and 
2005,  several  Euro -Med  Association 
Agreements  were  adopted.
6  The  EU 
concluded  Agreements  with  Egypt,  Israel, 
Jordan,  Lebanon,  Morocco,  Tunisia  and 
Algeria.  The  new  Association  Agreements 
included a deadline for the introduction of a 
free trade area in industrial goods by 2010. 
The preconditions for entering into this free 
trade  agreement  were  achievement  of 
macroeconomic stability, low dependence on 
trade taxes, a low level of external debt, a 
high  level  of  openness  to  trade,  a  liberal 
regulatory framework and a comprehens ive 
social safety net to minimis e the transition 
costs (Nsouli 2006). Tunisia qualified in 2008 
while other countries such as Libya and Syria 
lag behind. This policy however, potentially 
has  a  major  impact  on  many  of  the 
Mediterranean  economies.  If  Morocco ,  for 
example,  were  to  enter  into  the  FTA 
framework,  one  third  of  local  industries 
would  go  bankrupt,  one  third  would  need 
major restructuring and only one third would 
survive. The EU did offer funds to help with 
                                                      
5 The  Barcelona  Declaration  of  1995.  Web.  7  Oct  2011. 
<http://eeas.europa.eu/euromed/barcelona_en.htm>  
 
6 The current Association Agreements with Free Trade Area 
provisions: Algeria (2005), Croatia (2005), Egypt (2004), Israel 
(2000),  Jordan  (2002),  Lebanon  (2006),  Morocco  (2000), 
Palestinian Authority (1997), Tunisia (19 98). Turkey is in a 
Customs Union with the EU.  7 
this  transition  but  they  were  not  sufficient. 
Nevertheless the painful economic transition 
was  accepted  as  part  of  the  reforms 
necessary to create a free trade area with the 
EU, which also comes with other advantages 
in the developmental arena, and in broader 
political and security dialogue (Bicchi 2009).  
 
However, the political dialogue continued to 
be plagued by post-colonial sensitivities since 
many of the partners were former colonies of 
key EU member states. Security dialogue was 
further hampered by the lack of overarching 
security architectures or organisations in the 
southern/eastern  Mediterranean  region  and 
the  character  of  security  positions  of  both 
regions,  for  instance,  with  regards  to  the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.   
 
The events of 9/11 with the emergence of the 
Al  Qaeda  network  had  further  impacts  on 
how  security  issues  are  viewed  within  the 
Euro-Mediterranean  partnership.  According 
to  Tobias  Schumacher,
7 a consensus among 
the  political  elites  in  the  EU  and  its 
Mediterranean  partners  exists  that 
international terrorism after 9/11 is a new 
phenomenon  and  this  can  only  be  tackled 
with  stringent  measures  contained  in  the 
Euro-Mediterranean  Code  of  Conduct  on 
Terrorism. Schumacher noted that the fear of 
international terrorism and the rise of Islamic 
groups  related  to   the  Al  Qaeda  network 
provided the political leaders in the southern 
Mediterranean region the excuse to prioritise 
political  stability over political  liberalisation 
and  democratic  reforms.   The  EU  was 
complicit in this and newly imposed policies 
concerning  immigration, asylum and border 
controls  limited  civic  liberties  especially 
toward third-country nationals with an Islamic 
background.  
                                                      
7 Presentation  at  the  Euromesco  research  workshop 
‘Democracy and Migration in the Euro-Mediterranean Area’, 
27-8  September  2007,  Pembroke  College,  Cambridge,  as 
reported in Euromesco (2007). 
The  attacks  of  9/11  also  influenced 
perceptions  of  various  policy  issues  such  as 
migration, which are seen through the lens of 
national  security.  Migration  already  been  a 
subject  of  highly  politicized  and  sensitive 
policy  debates  in  the  EU  in  the  1990s,  and 
these debates further intensified after 9/11. 
Within  these  discussions,  migration  is 
increasingly  seen  as  a  danger  to  domestic 
society  and  discussed  together  with  the  so-
called ‘threat of Islam’. Migration was linked 
to  a  plethora  of  security  concerns  ranging 
across  ‘public  order,  cultural  identity,  and 
domestic  and  labour  market  stability’ 
(Huysmans  2000:  752).  To  limit  migration 
flows  from  the  southern/eastern 
Mediterranean  countries,  the  EU  has  for 
instance  increased  the  operation  of  both 
paramilitary  and  military  security  forces  on 
the EU’s Mediterranean borders (Eylemer and 
Semsit 2007: 56-60). 
 
In  evaluating  the  Barcelona  Process,  many 
analysts (Emerson and Noutcheva 2005; Soler 
i  Lecha  2008;  Kuach  and  Youngs  2009) 
attributed the lack of progress to the fact that 
the  goals  for  the  Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership were either too ambitious or too 
vague in the first place.  The partners in the 
Barcelona  Process  also  had  different 
expectations  towards  the  partnership.  For 
example, the priority of the EU was to ensure 
stability  in  the  Mediterranean  region  and 
hoped that the countries in this region would 
adopt European values and models and that 
these in turn would underpin the stability of 
this  region.  However,  for  many  of  the 
Mediterranean  partners,  their  primary 
priority  was  better  access  to  the  European 
markets and development aid.  
 
Despite its ambitious economic goals, and the 
increased provision of EU development aid to 
the partners, the gap between the EU and the 
southern  Mediterranean  region  remained. 
The  average  GDP  of  the  Mediterranean 
partner countries remains at least five times  8 
lower  than  the  average  GDP  of  the  27  EU 
member states despite the fact that the EU 
has enlarged to include several lower middle-
income  countries  (Magnan-Marionnet  2008: 
19-20) 
 
The  lack  of  progress  in  satisfying  economic 
ambitions  is  supported  by  a  FEMISE  (2010) 
report,
8 which  concluded  that   fifteen  years 
after the Barcelona process, customs tariffs 
on  European  goods  imported  by 
Mediterranean countries remain just as high. 
Moreover,  Europe  still  has  not  opened  its 
borders to several agricultural products from 
the Maghreb. Finally, the report  makes clear 
that  foreign  direct  investment   and  capital 
flows between 2004 and 2009 appeared also 
to be very limited.  
 
Despite  these  divergences  in  goals  and 
expectations, a positive contribution of this 
multilateral cooperation is that it has brought 
together  several  Middle  Eastern  countries, 
including Israel and the Palestinian Authority, 
and offered a platform for Israel to meet its 
neighbours  to  build  confidence  and  trust. 
However  the  complexities  of  the  conflicts 
between the Arabs and the Israelis have  also 
hindered  progress  in  political  cooperation 
between the EU and its southern partners. 
For example, the proposal to develop a  Euro-
Mediterranean Charter for Stability and Peace 
failed  because  of  divergent  perceptions  of 
threats and challenges to politi cal stability, 
making  one  wonder  if  the  EU  was  unduly 
naïve  in  its  approach  to  its  so uthern 
neighbours (Attinà 2004). 
 
Overall,  the  Barcelona  Process   suffered 
because  of  the  increasing  Israeli -Arab 
tensions  after  the  breakdown  of  the  Oslo 
agreements. 9/11 and international terrorism 
                                                      
8 FEMISE is an EU-funded project, which aims to contribute to 
the  reinforcement  of  dialogue  on  economic  and  financial 
issues  in  the  Euro-Mediterranean  partnership,  within  the 
framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy and the 
Union for the Mediterranean. 
also seemed to fuel insecurity within the EU 
resulting  in  the  rise  of  extreme-right  and 
xenophobic political parties within Europe. All 
these trends were not helpful in cementing a 
strong  partnership  between  the  EU  and  its 
southern Mediterranean neighbours. But the 
main  obstacle  to  better  relations  was  the 
continued  reign  of  many  authoritarian 
regimes in this region. Many of these regimes 
rejected any kind of conditionality that the EU 
tried  to  impose  in  its  cooperation 
programmes (Crawford 2005).  
 
EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy and its 
impact on Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
 
The  post-Cold  War  situation  and  the  EU’s 
eastward enlargement led to a rethink and a 
broader  formulation  of  a  European 
Neighbourhood  Policy  (ENP).
9 The  ENP  was 
set up in 2004 with the objective of avoiding 
the emergence of new dividing lines between 
the enlarged EU and its neighbours. The ENP 
was envisioned to deal with the change in the 
geopolitical landscape of the eastern part of 
the EU and the need for stability with its new 
neighbours and finally to cope with a more 
complex  decision -making  process  after 
enlargement.  The  ENP  was  thus  primarily 
aimed at addressing the challenges in the East. 
However, under the pressure of the southern 
EU member states, the ENP was extended to 
the southern neighbours.  
 
Currently the ENP includes relations with 16 
of  the  EU's  neighbours,  which  can  be 
categorised into two types   –  former  Soviet 
states  in  Eastern  Europe  and  the  South 
Caucasus;  and  Arab  states  and  Israel  in  the 
southern  and  eastern  Mediterranean 
region.
10 Some countries in the first category 
                                                      
9 Cyprus,  the  Czech  Republic,  Estonia,  Hungary,  Latvia, 
Lithuania,  Malta,  Poland,  Slovakia  and  Slovenia  became 
member states of the EU on 1 May 2004.  
 
10 Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, 
Jordan,  Lebanon,  Libya,  Moldova,  Morocco, the  Occupied 
Palestinian Territories, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine.  9 
might  eventually  become  candidates  for  EU 
membership, while the Southern and Eastern 
Mediterranean states are not generally seen 
as potential members (COM 2003; 104 final; 
5). 
 
The ENP differs from the Barcelona Process in 
two  ways.  Firstly,  the  ENP  moves  from  the 
overarching multilateral framework approach 
of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) 
to  a  strategy  of  bilateralism  with 
differentiation.  Differentiation  means  that 
relations  with  each  neighbouring  country 
would  call  for  different  approaches,  taking 
into consideration the process and degree of 
their integration with the EU. Of course, the 
EMP  also  incorporates  bilateral  agreements 
but these were based on very similar terms 
and policies. The ENP, however, also gave the 
opportunity  to  individual  Mediterranean 
countries to upgrade their bilateral relations 
with the EU and there were positive elements 
for taking such bilateral approaches (Aliboni 
et  al  2008:  14).  For  the  EU,  the  bilateral 
agreements were an opportunity to extend its 
political  and  economical  influence  into  the 
southern  Mediterranean.  At  the  same  time, 
the  EU’s  Mediterranean  partners  also 
preferred the cooperation on a bilateral basis. 
Several  of  the  Mediterranean  states  never 
really quite appreciated being put in a group 
together  with  rivals  and  even  declared 
enemies  such  as  Israel  in  the  Barcelona 
Process (Del Sarto and Schumacher 2005: 26).  
 
The  ENP  also  introduced  political 
conditionality  –  the  use  of  conditions                           
attached to a loan, aid or a membership of an 
organisation  –  but  since  there  was  little 
possibility  of  those  countries  particularly              
in the Middle East and North Africa becoming 
EU members, it was never rigorously pursued. 
The  use  of  conditionality  by  the  EU  has                    
been  most  successful  where  membership              
of the EU is a possibility. In the enlargement 
process,  candidate  countries  wanting             
to  become  EU  members  have  to  fulfill                
the  Copenhagen  criteria  and  adopt  the                
acquis  communautaire.
11  However,  where 
membership  of the EU is remote, tying aid , 
loans and trade agreements to democracy, 
human rights and good governance reforms 
has not had much impact.   
 
As the ENP resulted from internal logic within 
the  EU  rather  than  of  realities  in  the 
Mediterranean countries, it is therefore not 
surprising that the ENP does not address the 
socio-economic  realities  of  the  southern 
Mediterranean region and the s hortcomings 
of  the  Euro -Mediterranean  Partnership.  In 
comparison with the Barcelona Process, the 
ENP  as  applied  to  the  countries  in  the 
southern  Mediterranean  region  can  be 
described  as  bilateral  cooperation  which 
mainly  focuses  on  technical  and  economic 
issues.  The  issue  of  political  reform, 
democracy and human rights was not actively 
pursued (Grant 2011: 4). This view is shared 
by the EU itself. In its own analysis of the first 
six  years  of  the  ENP,  the  Euro pean 
Commission concluded that  
 
The pace of progress is determined by the 
degree to which partners have been willing 
to  undertake  the  necessary  reforms,  and 
more  has  been  achieved in  the economic 
sphere,  notably  trade  and  regulatory 
approximation,  than  in  the  area  of 
democratic governance. However, the pace 
of  progress  also  depends  on  the  benefits 
that  partners  can  expect  within  a 
reasonable time frame. Here the extent to 
which  the  EU  has  been  willing  to  engage 
itself with the partnership has also had, and 
will continue to have, a significant effect.  
 
(European Commission 2010) 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
11 That  is,  the  whole  body  of  European  Law,  consisting  of 
legislation, legal acts and court decisions.   10 
The French proposal - Union for the 
Mediterranean (UfM) 
 
The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) is the 
latest  development  in  the  history  of  EU-
Mediterranean relations. On 7 February 2007, 
Nicolas  Sarkozy,  then  a  candidate  for  the 
presidency of France, launched a proposal for 
the UfM.
12 According to him, this would mark 
the re-establishment of cooperation among 
European and those Mediterranean countries 
which are outside the framework of the EU, 
and  to  address   the  shortcomings  of   the 
Barcelona Process.  However, some analysts 
(Aliboni et al 2008) believed that it was not 
the shortcomings of the Barcelona Process , 
but French concerns about its decreasing role 
in the Mediterranean region that lay behind 
the French UfM proposal (ibid). 
 
The  French  proposal  brought  about  mixed 
reactions within the EU. The main reservation 
was  expressed  by  Germany;  Angela  Merkel 
pointed out that the UfM should be open for 
all  EU  states  and  the  project  should  be 
situated  within  the  framework  of  the 
Barcelona  Process  (Soler  i  Lecha  2008:  28). 
This  comment  reflected  Germany’s 
questioning over the motives of the French, 
and  also  concern  that  EU  money  would  be 
used to fund a project which would benefit 
only  a  small  number  of  EU  member  states. 
The  Commission  and  especially  the  units 
involved in the Barcelona Process were also 
unhappy about the proposal as they regarded 
it  as  a  criticism  of  the  Barcelona  Process. 
Nevertheless  Benita  Ferrero-Waldner,  then 
Commissioner  for  External  Relations, 
requested  that  the  Commission  also  be 
represented at the highest level in this new 
UfM.  Despite  unhappiness  and  scepticism 
from  some  quarters,  the  proposal  did  gain 
support from some EU member states. At a 
                                                      
12 The members of  the first  proposal were  Cyprus, France, 
Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, 
Tunisia,  Israel,  Jordan,  Palestine,  Lebanon,  Syria  and  some 
regional unions.  
two-day  conference  in  January  2008,  the 
‘Olive  Group’  –  a  grouping  of  southern  EU 
member  states  –  declared  their  support. 
Spain  and  Italy  were  the  most  enthusiastic 
supporters of the proposal. 
 
The responses from the EU’s partners to the 
UfM were also divergent, but two issues were 
at the core of their scepticism and criticism. 
The  relation  between  the  Arabs  and  the 
Israelis  was  the  first  issue  as  the  UfM  still 
includes Israel. The EU continued to harbour 
the  hope  that  putting  some  (Arab) 
Mediterranean  countries  and  Israel  in  one 
cooperation  platform  could  help  to  temper 
the  Arab-Israeli  conflict.  However,  with  the 
preferred bilateral relations of the ENP, some 
of these Mediterranean partners now had an 
alternative and were not willing to cooperate 
to normalise their relations with Israel under 
this broad regional framework.  The second 
fear of the Arab countries was a renewal of 
the  so-called  European  paternalism  or  neo-
colonialism.  The 
 Algerian  foreign  minister 
Mourad  Medelci  noted  that  ‘relations  with 
the EU are unbalanced and decisions belong 
to  those  who  have  money  and  know-how’ 
(Schlumberger  2011:  138).  The  doubts 
expressed by some of the EU’s Mediterranean 
partners  towards  further  cooperation  with 
the  EU  demonstrates  that  despite  the 
engagement since the 1970s, a certain level 
of  suspicion  and  distrust  continues  to  exist 
and  impact  the  relations  between  the  two 
regions.  
 
Turkey (which was party to the UfM proposal) 
was  also  initially  sceptical,  seeing  it  as  a 
French ploy to distract from the discussion of 
the accession of Turkey into the EU. President 
Sarkozy tried to reassure Turkey that this was 
not the intention and played up the role that 
Turkey  could  play  in  the  UfM  as  ‘a  great 
Mediterranean country’.  
 
At the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean on 
13  July  2008,  43  countries  from  the  Euro- 11 
Mediterranean  region  came  together  to 
relaunch the Barcelona Process and create a 
Union  for  the  Mediterranean  (UfM).
13 New 
countries  were  added  to  the  cooperation, 
namely  Bosnia -Herzegovina,  Croatia, 
Montenegro  and  Monaco.  The  large 
membership made it difficult to reconcile the 
very divergent national interests and hence 
diluted the intensity of the partnership.  
 
The key aim of the UfM is to promote projects 
among groups of countries that are keen to 
do  so.  Therefore  the  UfM  launched  six 
concrete  initiatives  to  which  the  member 
states can take part on a voluntary basis: 
 
1)  alleviating pollution in the Mediterranean 
area; 
2)  the  construction  of  highways  and  sea 
routes between ports;  
3)  cooperation after natural disasters; 
4)  the development of solar energy; 
5)  the establishment of a new university in 
Slovenia; and  
6)  investments in businesses.  
 
As  one  can  observe,  the  UfM  focuses  on 
relatively  uncontroversial  areas  of 
cooperation.  Moreover,  some  issues  at  this 
technical  level  were  already  the  subject  of 
institutionalised  cooperation  in  earlier 
partnerships (Kauch and Youngs 2009: 965). 
With the emphasis on functional cooperation, 
the EU’s purported focus on human rights and 
democracy has become diluted. While within 
the Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit, the 
political will to turn the Mediterranean region 
into  an  area  of  peace,  democracy, 
cooperation  and  prosperity  was  stated,  in 
practice,  the  EU  was  instead  looking  for  a 
region with ‘good enough stable governance’ 
because of security reasons. If one compares 
                                                      
13 The  Union  for  the  Mediterranean  members  are  the  27 
European Union member states and the 16 Mediterranean 
Partner  countries  (Albania,  Algeria,  Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Monaco, 
Montenegro,  Morocco,  the  Palestinian  Authority,  Syria, 
Tunisia and Turkey). 
the UfM with the Barcelona Process and the 
ENP,  political  conditionality  seems  to  have 
been relinquished (Bicchi 2011: 14).  
 
One of the biggest innovations of the UfM has 
been  its  institutional  framework.  The  UfM 
introduced two new institutions – a system of 
co-presidency  and  the  establishment  of  a 
secretariat.  The  system  of  co-presidency, 
proposed  by  the  non-EU  Mediterranean 
partners, assures that the UfM is managed by 
one president from the EU and one from the 
other Mediterranean partners (non-EU Med). 
The  partners  argued  that  the  co-presidency 
should be a symbol of an equal partnership 
and would make each partner more aware of 
its  responsibilities  and  motivate  all  towards 
active  engagement  (MEDEA,  European 
institute  for  research  on  Euro-Arab 
cooperation). However, as both co-presidents 
are of equal status, the co-presidents can also 
veto each other’s proposals.  This created the 
situation  that  controversial  issues  and  any 
criticisms  of  autocratic  powers  in  the 
southern  and  eastern  Mediterranean  would 
hardly  make  onto  the  agenda  for  the  UfM 
meetings. Hence the UfM cannot manage any 
kind  of  meaningful  political  dialogue  that 
would  promote  political  reform 
(Schlumberger 2011: 142).  
 
Like  the  Barcelona  Process,  the  UfM  is 
similarly affected by the animosities between 
the Arab countries and Israel and the ongoing 
tension  between  Israel  and  the  Palestinian 
Authority. Since the creation of the UfM, the 
calendar  of  meetings  has  not  been  without 
disruption. The second Biennial Summit of the 
Heads of State and Government should have 
taken place in one of the EU’s Mediterranean 
partners  in  July  2010.  However  the  Euro-
Mediterranean countries agreed to hold the 
summit in Barcelona on 7 June 2010. On 20 
May,  Egypt,  France  –  the  two  first  co-
presidents – and Spain
14 decided to postpone 
                                                      
14 Spain held the presidency of the Council of the European 
Union from January to July 2010. As in 1989, 1995 and 2002,  12 
the  summit  because  the  indirect  talks 
between Israel and the Palestinian Authority 
needed  more  time.  Moreover,  a  reason 
mentioned  in  the  media  was  the  threat  of 
Arab countries to boycott the summit should 
Avigdor  Lieberman,  Israel's  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  attend  the  summit.    The 
postponed  summit  was  rescheduled to take 
place  in  Barcelona  on  21  November  2010. 
Nevertheless,  France  and  Egypt  decided 
together with Spain to postpone the summit 
again because of the Israel-Palestine conflict 
(Bicchi 2011: 12).  
 
Although  the  UfM  is  still  at  its  early  stage, 
UfM  suffers  from  the  same  problems  – 
diverse  and  large  membership,  tensions 
between  Israeli  and  several  of  its  Arab 
neighbours, etc, that plague the earlier EMP. 
Some  criticism  is  also  expressed  of  the 
economic  cooperation  as  the  southern 
Mediterranean countries were not given full 
access to the European market, especially in 
agriculture,  and    ‘without  free  access  for 
agriculture’, the EU is not seen as credible as 
a  foreign  policy  actor  who  can  balance  the 
strategic  and  political  considerations  with 
economic  constraints’  (Kausch  and  Young 
2009: 967).  
 
Overall,  one  could  see  that  the  EU-
Mediterranean  partnership  in  its  various 
incarnations (from GMP to Barcelona Process 
to UfM) suffered from the way the EU tried to 
‘impose’  its  views  of  a  ‘region’.  By  putting 
Israel together with its Arab neighbours in the 
naïve  hope  that  the  EU-Mediterranean 
partnership would offer some sort of platform 
for Israel and its Arab neighbours to promote 
confidence  building  and  trust  in  the  region 
added  unnecessary  tensions  to  the 
partnership. The overall partnership suffered 
and cooperation has been impeded time and 
again by the Palestinian-Israeli conflicts. The 
desire to pursue a comprehensive partnership 
                                                                                   
the EU’s Mediterranean agenda has always been a priority 
for the Spanish presidency.   
was  also  diluted  over  the  years  because  of 
political  tensions,  structural  economic 
problems and the increasing gap between the 
EU  and  its  Mediterranean  partners.  The  EU 
has to temper its initial hopes of transforming 
the  region  through  its  partnership  and 
association  agreements  to  focus  more  on 
functional  cooperation  and  the  EU’s 
overriding desire to maintain political stability 
in the region. 
 
 
3.  The EU’s response to  the Arab 
Spring 
 
The  Arab  Spring  is  a  term  used  in  popular 
media  for  the  uprisings  and  protests  which 
have been taking place in the Middle East and 
North  Africa  since  18  December  2010.  The 
Arab  Spring  protests  have  toppled 
authoritarian  leaders  such  as  Ben  Ali  in 
Tunisia  and  Mubarak  in  Egypt,  and  have 
catalysed a wave of pro-democracy protests. 
What  are  the  causes  for  the  sweeping 
changes,  and  what  are  the  immediate 
responses from the EU?   
 
There are many inter-locking reasons for the 
Arab  Spring.  In  an  interview  with  James  M. 
Dorsey, an award winning journalist, he noted 
that the overall issue was the lack of respect 
and the sense of degradation that fuelled the 
protests from the people against the rulers. 
One could add that fundamentally there has 
been a combination of political and economic 
stagnation with rampant corruption, growing 
inequalities  and  pockets  of  human  rights 
abuses  and  lack  of  opportunities  for  a 
growing  population  of  better-educated 
youths. Anger over authoritarian regimes has 
increased as the latter tried to tighten their 
hold  over  power  at  all  costs.    Despite  local 
differences, the protestors in Tunisia, Egypt, 
Syria and Yemen shared two major aims: the 
overthrowing  of  the  old  regimes  for  the 
establishment of new political orders and the 
improvement of economic opportunities.    13 
After years of promoting Euro-Mediterranean 
partnership  which  include  countries 
embroiled in the current turmoil, one could 
not help but wonder if the EU was aware of 
this rising discontent and see the Arab Spring 
coming.  If the EU-Mediterranean partnership 
had been stronger and had not been weighed 
down  by  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict;  if  the 
partnership had succeeded in improving the 
economic  livelihoods  of  the  majority  of  the 
people  in  southern  and  eastern 
Mediterranean,  would  a  smoother  political 
transition have  taken  place?    If  the  EU had 
insisted on political conditionality and actively 
promoted  human  rights  and  democracy  in 
this region, would the events have turned out 
differently?  
 
Some scholars have argued that the EU has 
missed  its  chance  in  using  conditionality  to 
support  political  reforms  in  many  of  the 
Mediterranean  partner  countries.  Progress 
reports  from  the  ENP  showed  that  the  EU 
increased  aid  to  countries  such  as  Tunisia, 
Egypt and Morocco even though there was no 
visible progress in the improvement of human 
rights  in  these  countries  (ENP  Progress 
Reports  2010  for  Tunisia,
15  Egypt
16  and 
Morocco
17).  Youngs (2006) in fact is of the 
opinion  that  France,  Spain  and  Italy 
influenced  the  EU  to  mitigate  the  use  of 
conditionality  on  its  aid  to  North  African 
countries. These southern EU member states 
have  downplayed  conditionality because  of 
the  commercial  contracts  they  had ,  and 
because  of  the  fear  of  destabilising  the 
regimes  that  protected  their  investments 
(Grant 2011: 3).  
                                                      
15 European Commission (2010) Taking stock of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP): 2009 progress report for Tunisia, 
SEC (2010) 514.  
 
16 European Commission (2010) Taking stock of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP): 2009 progress report for Egypt, 
SEC (2010) 517.  
 
17 European Commission (2010) Taking stock of the European 
Neighbourhood  Policy  (ENP):  2009  progress  report  for 
Morocco, SEC (2010) 521. 
Other  instances  of  the  EU  not  being  more 
forthright  in  its  support  for  political  reform 
and efforts to uphold democracy include its 
silence  on  the  ‘rigged’  elections  in  Egypt  in 
2009,  the  offer  of  an  upgraded  Association 
Agreement
18 with  Tunisia  despite  election 
irregularities and the negotiation with Libya 
for a  Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Area  (DCFTA)  (Grant  2011:   10).  The  EU 
continued  its  engage ment  with  the 
authoritarian  regimes  in  the  southern 
Mediterranean  for  three  reasons:  political 
security such as preventing the rise of political 
extremism, energy security  (mainly oil)  and 
lastly, to manage migration.  
 
Economic  stagnation,  widespread  poverty, 
inequalities,  and  high  un employment, 
particularly among the youth, contributed to 
the  growing  discontent.  These  in  turn  are 
closely  linked  to  the  political  stagnation 
brought about by authoritarian regimes who, 
according to Schlumberger  (2011: 136), were 
more concerned with weeding out opposition 
and challenges to their power and lining their 
own pockets than to focus on economic and 
human  development  for  the  population  at 
large . Even in countries like Tunisia and Egypt 
which enjoyed a period of econ omic growth 
because of market-friendly economic reforms, 
most  people  still  experienced  a  decline  in 
living standards because of the lack of social, 
educational and political reforms to cope with 
the rapid changes in societies.  Close to half of 
the Arab world’s population is below 25 years 
of age, well-educated but mostly unemployed. 
Many of these governments were unable to 
institute comprehensive policies and reforms 
that would unleash the full potential of their 
human resources (Bajorie 2011).  
 
                                                      
18 An Association Agreement is a treaty between the EU and 
a non-EU country that creates a framework for co-operation. 
Areas  frequently  covered  by  such  agreements  include  the 
development of political, trade, social, cultural and security 
links.  The  legal  base  for  the  association  agreements  is 
provided by art. 217 TFEU (formerly art. 310 TEC).  14 
An  important  characteristic  of  the  Arab 
uprisings  was  the  combination  of  a  large 
frustrated  group  of  youths  and  their use  of 
social media. Some have described the Arab 
protests as a Facebook or Twitter revolution. 
Attempts  by the  government  to  control  the 
internet could not stem the tide of protests. 
For  example  the  Egyptian  government  shut 
down  all  internet  service  for  a few  days  by 
ordering internet service providers within the 
country  to  shut  down  all  services  within  a 
short  notice,  a  move  which  was  really 
unprecedented (Shah 2011: 4). This, however, 
did not stop the protests from growing. 
 
For  many  of  the  Arab  countries  in  the 
southern  and  eastern  part  of  the 
Mediterranean,  economic  relations  with  the 
EU are ‘far more prominent than with the US. 
More than 50 per cent of their trade is with 
the EU’. The EU is ‘also the largest provider of 
financial  assistance  and  the  largest  foreign 
investor’  (Schulz  2010:  7-8).  Although  the 
focus of EU-Mediterranean relations has been 
on economic issues in the past few years, this 
has  been  mainly  at  the  government-to-
government level and there was insufficient 
focus  on  the  development  of  the  private 
sector.  Economic  wealth  remained 
concentrated within the small class of political 
elites and their cronies (Grant 2011: 4).  
 
On  hindsight,  the  EU-Mediterranean 
partnership from the 1990s to the eve of the 
Arab  Spring  focused  primarily  on  official 
state-to-state  relations.  It  lacked  a  broader 
approach towards society, a policy failing that 
the  EU  would  have  to  reflect  upon  as  it 
considers a new approach to the region in the 
aftermath  of  such  tumultuous  changes. 
Indeed, some scholars such as Schlumberger 
(2011:  140)  remarked  that  the  UfM  and 
earlier partnerships  were  focused too  much 
on  state-to-state  relations  and  had  a  P2P 
(palace-to-palace  or  president-to-president) 
bias. 
 
Besides  some  criticisms  of  its  past  failures, 
the EU’s responses to the Arab Spring have 
also  been  criticised  by  analysts  such  as 
Brattberg (2011), Grant (2011), Etzioni (2011), 
as  too  little  and  too  late.  It  took  the  EU  a 
month  to  condemn  the  use  of  violence  in 
Tunisia by Ben Ali’s regime against his people. 
The revolt in Egypt did bring about a faster 
response, with France, Germany, Italy, Spain 
and  the  UK  signing  a  joint  statement  that 
condemned the use of violence and called for 
a ‘quick and orderly transition’ and response 
to the crisis in Libya was led by France and the 
UK (Brattberg 2011: 1). 
 
Besides  the  issuing  of  statements,  the  EU 
launched  restrictive  measures  against  some 
Mediterranean  countries.  Among  these 
measures  were  the  freezing  of  assets,  the 
embargo on arms, visa bans on top officials.
19 
Yet in doing this, Balfour (2011) argues that 
the EU is following the other members of the 
UN Security Council instead of taking the lead 
and  acting  swiftly  in  a   region  that  is 
considered its ‘neighbourhood’. Hitherto, the 
United  States  (US)  and  the  EU  have  placed 
sanctions on Syria’s Assad and his family. In 
an interview, analyst James Dorsey expressed 
concerns that sanctions will heighten strains 
on  the  Syrian  economy  that  is  already 
deteriorating. But the US and EU have been 
unable  to  persuade  Russia  and  China  to 
abandon opposition to a UN Security Council 
resolution  condemning  Syria's  actions.  The 
discussion  and  actions  taken  show  the 
complexities  of  the  situation  and  the 
difference in opinion on action to be taken. 
While  some  members  of  the  EU  have 
intervened in Libya invoking the principle of 
                                                      
19 International restrictive measures or sanctions are foreign 
policy decisions that need to be approved unanimously by 
the Council as established by Chapter 2, Title V, of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Union (TEU). The list of the types 
of sanctions that can be imposed by the EU is long but the 
most common ones are financial restrictions, commodity and 
service boycotts, arms embargoes and travel bans (Guemelli 
2010). 
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‘responsibility  to  protect’,
20 the unity of the 
action  was  compromised  by  Germany’s 
abstention  in  the  UN  to  support  the 
imposition  of  a  no-fly  zone  and  possible 
military intervention in Libya.   
 
A heated debate on the intervention in Libya 
was  sparked  after  three  months  of  NATO 
bombing.    The  UN  mandate  for  the 
intervention  is  to  protect  civilians  from 
Gaddafi’s  forces.  However,  after  weeks  of 
bombing, there were concerns that NATO had 
gone  beyond  the  responsibility  to  protect 
principle and broadened its mission to include 
‘regime change’. However, there were people 
who  argued  that  the  intervention  in  Libya 
marked a new beginning in the Middle East 
and  North  Africa.  Finally  proponents  argue 
that  the  intervention  is  necessary  to  deter 
other  regimes  from  deploying  violence 
against peaceful protestors.  
The  implementation  of  sanctions  and  the 
strong  actions  taken  against  Libya  furnish 
perhaps  examples  of  the  double  standards 
applied  by  the  ‘West’.  Amirahmadi  and 
Afrasiabi (2011) explain that the EU and US 
are  ‘using  double  standards  by  imposing 
sanctions  on  Iran  for  their  human  rights 
violations  and  taking  military  action  against 
the  Libyan  dictator  while  failing  to  address 
the  appalling  repression  of  the  pro-
democracy movement in Bahrain’. It also took 
the  West  after  months  of  repression  and 
outright  violence  against  protestors  in  Syria 
before the US finally called for Assad to leave.  
The  EU’s  earlier  policies  towards  its  Middle 
East  and  North  African  partners  in  the 
Mediterranean  region  have  been  seen  as  a 
failure  in  responding  to  the  needs  of  the 
                                                      
20 The  concept  of  the  ‘responsibility  to  protect’  originated 
from  the  idea  that  sovereignty  is  not  a  privilege,  but  a 
responsibility.  This  concept,  accepted  by  the  UN  in  2005 
(Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit), renders it a 
responsibility of the international community to act if a state 
fails to protect its citizens from ‘genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing, and crimes against humanity’. 
 
people. The focus on order and stability, and 
the  willingness  of  the  EU  to  accommodate 
and  continue  to  provide  aid  to  the 
authoritarian  regimes  in  several  of  these 
countries put the EU in an awkward position 
when the people in these countries rose up 
against  their  governments  demanding 
political reform.  
 
 
4.  Consequences of the Arab Spring 
for the future of Euro-
Mediterranean partnership 
 
The  transition  and  turmoil  taking  place  in 
several of the countries that are members of 
the  EU-Mediterranean partnership  are likely 
to  have  significant  implications  on  the  EU’s 
future  policies  towards  the  southern  and 
eastern  Mediterranean.  The  ways  in  which 
the  EU  could  support  and  shape  the 
developments in this region will be the focus 
of this section. 
 
The transition to democracy 
 
The  Arab  Spring  has  unleashed  hopes  that 
democracy will spread in the Arab world. The 
paths  to  democracy  may  be  different  and 
bumpy,  but  there  is  general  consensus  that 
the  region  will  never  be  the  same  again. 
Successful  transition  to  democracy  will  of 
course depend on many factors, among them, 
on  the  countries’  circumstances  and  the 
degree  of  preparation  by  the  people  and 
institutions  for  their  new  roles  and 
responsibilities.  External  support  can  be 
helpful, but ultimately the new political order 
would need to be shaped by domestic actors, 
and the EU needs to be mindful as it crafts its 
policies  in  response  to  the  changes  taking 
place.   
 
In  the  past months,  Egypt  and  Tunisia  have 
both,  in  different  manners,  taken  steps  to 
form a new government after the overthrow 
of  Mubarak  and  Ben  Ali  respectively.  But  16 
whether  this  will  lead  to  democracy  as 
defined  or  wanted  by  the  ‘West’  remains 
unclear. What is clear, however, as put forth 
by the new head of the Mediterranean Union, 
Youssef Amrani, is that while Western friends 
should support Arab Spring reforms they can 
no longer dictate the terms for democracy.  
In the past the EU had focused on creating a 
ring of firmly governed states to establish a 
stable  region.  The  concerns  for  maintaining 
order  and  stability  in  the  south  of 
Mediterranean and the Arab region overrode 
concerns about democracy and human rights. 
This  has  affected  the  EU’s  credibility, 
especially  with  regards  to  democracy 
promotion  in  the  Mediterranean  region 
especially because of their efforts to isolate 
Hamas  when  the  latter  won  the  Palestinian 
elections
21 (Behr 2010: 85-87).  
 
The  current  changes  demand  that  the  EU 
adopt a new policy towards its Mediterranean 
partners.  With  the  ‘Partnership  for 
Democracy and Shared Prosperity’, a proposal 
by  the  European  Commission  and  the 
European External Action Service (EEAS), the 
promotion of democracy and human rights is 
now  at  the  centre  of  this  new  partnership, 
and  signals  the first  concrete  step  taken  by 
the EU to adjust to the new situation in the 
region. The EU is also proposing to pay more 
attention  to  non-governmental  actors 
through the new Civil Society Facility and the 
Endowment  for  Democracy.  This  new  body 
will  provide  grants  to  non-registered  NGOs 
and political parties (Balfour 2011).  
 
                                                      
21 On 25 January 2006 elections were held for the Palestinian 
Legislative Council (PLC). This was the first time after 1996. 
Final results showed that Hamas won the elections with 74 
seats  to  45  seats  for  Fatah.  The  response  of  the  Israeli 
government, the US and the EU was to demand that Hamas 
formally  recognise  Israel’s  right  to  exist  and  ‘renounce 
violence’ before they would recognise the new Palestinian 
government.  Because  of  a  negative  response  by  Hamas, 
foreign  aid  from  the  US  and  the  EU  to  the  Palestinian 
authority  was  cut  massively  and  economic  sanctions  were 
imposed.  
However,  some  scholars  like  Behr  (2010) 
argue that the EU has to define more clearly 
what and who it will support, and be mindful 
of the perceptions about such support by its 
Mediterranean  partners,  should  political 
conditionality be strictly imposed again. The 
EU should also consider, in the light of past 
failures  in  the  EU  neighbourhood,  the 
effectiveness  of  such  conditionality  in 
promoting  reforms.  Indeed  some  European 
Commission officials argue that the EU should 
stop  talking  about  foregrounding 
conditionality. 
 
While there is renewed desire for the EU to 
support  democracy  and  human  rights  and 
craft  a  new  partnership  with  its  southern 
Mediterranean partners, the following factors 
and developments will also continue to shape 
and influence the EU’s response and policy.  
 
The role of political Islam 
 
Many of the protests in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, 
etc  were  led  by  groups  not associated  with 
the Islamist parties. In fact, it was noted that 
political  Islam  and  many  Islamic  groups  had 
not  featured  prominently  in  these  popular 
uprisings.  However,  several  analysts  and 
observers  of  the  region  believe  that  well-
organised Islamic groups will begin to play a 
more important role in the ongoing transition. 
This is because they are ‘frequently the most 
important or even the only forces which have 
managed to survive under repressive regimes’ 
and  are  the  best-organised  (Hanelt  and 
Mőller 2011: 5). The Muslim Brotherhood, the 
best-known  Islamic  group,  has  its  roots  in 
combating colonialism and it sees Islam as the 
solution for national problems.  
 
The  lack  of  understanding  with  regards  to 
political  Islam  and  lack  of  engagement  with 
Islamist groups create unjustified fears that if 
the  Islamist  groups  or  parties  come  into 
power  in  countries  around  the  southern 
Mediterranean, the region will become more  17 
volatile  and  less  amenable  to  Western 
interests  (Hamid  2011).  Tariq  Ramadan 
however  urged  the  West  to  try  and 
understand  that  Islamism  occupies  several 
positions across the ideological spectrum. Not 
all  of  them  are  radical  and  in  fact  many  of 
them  reject  violence  and  condemn  acts  of 
terrorism  (Corral  2011).  An  example  here  is 
the Justice and Development Party in Turkey, 
a  party  with  Islamist  roots  working  in  a 
democratic arena (Grant 2011: 2).  
 
The role of political Islam has been one of the 
main  obstacles  to  the  deepening  of  Euro-
Mediterranean  relations.  Before  the  Arab 
Spring,  the  EU  remained  cautious  in  its 
cooperation  with  Islamist  opposition  in  the 
Arab  states.  The  distrust  of  European 
governments  towards  Islamic  groups  and 
political  Islam  runs  deep,  particularly  after 
9/11.  Political  Islam  and  Islamic 
fundamentalism  are  increasingly  flagged  by 
right-wing  politicians  in  Europe  as 
contributing to radicalisation and problems of 
integration  of  the  Muslim  communities  in 
their own societies. The tendency to equate 
political  Islam  with  radicalism  and 
fundamentalism  led  to  the  unwillingness  of 
the  EU  to  engage  Islamic  parties  and 
organizations  and  their  followers  and  their 
subsequent  marginalisation.  Many  of  the 
autocratic  regimes  in  the  southern  and 
eastern  Mediterranean  capitalised  on  the 
fears of Europeans, equating any challenge to 
their rule with fermentation by ‘Islamists’ and 
playing up the threat of terrorism.  However, 
the reality in many parts of the Middle East 
and  North  Africa  is  that  these  Islamists  are 
the principal agents for social and economic 
change (Aliboni et al 2008: 16).  
 
Currently  within  the  EU,  there  are  different 
opinions  towards  the  development  of 
democracy and the role of political Islam in 
the Mediterranean. While it is clear that many 
of  the  popular  uprisings  were  sparked  by 
youths  and  professionals,  and  that  Islamic 
groups  only  played  a  very  modest  role  in 
these  uprising,  some  people  are  concerned 
that  the  Middle  East  and  North  African 
countries are not ready for democracy.  They 
note  that  the  groups  in  the  protests  are 
relatively  disparate  and  disorganised  and  if 
elections  were  to  be  held,  they  would  be 
hijacked  by  the  better  organised  Islamic 
groups  (Grant  2011).    The  question  then 
arises  as  to  whether  the  EU,  in  providing 
future assistance to the region, should focus 
on  efforts  to  help  the  different  groups  in 
these societies to organise themselves so that 
the reformist agenda is not hijacked by any 
one particular group. Others caution that in 
trying to forge a better partnership with its 
predominantly Muslim partners in the region, 
the EU must pay attention not only to non-
religious civil society organisations but must 
also be willing to discard its prejudice and be 
open to engagement with Islamic groups.  
 
Economic and energy considerations   
 
In the proposed ‘Partnership for Democracy 
and Shared Prosperity’, the EU expressed its 
ambition to forge a Deep and Comprehensive 
Free  Trade  Area  (DCFTA)  with  its  Southern 
and  Eastern  Mediterranean  partners. 
However, analysts noted that such a deep and 
comprehensive FTA is meaningless if the EU 
does  not  lift  restrictions  to  agricultural 
produce such as olive oil, wine, various fruit 
and  vegetables  as  these  remain  the  key 
exports  of  many  of  the  Mediterranean 
partners (Grant 2011: 6).  
 
Unrest  in  North  Africa  and  the  Middle  East 
has  historically  been  a  source  for  the 
fluctuations in prices of crude oil on the world 
markets.  The  Yom  Kippur  War  in  1973,  the 
Iranian revolution in 1979 and Iraq’s invasion 
of Kuwait in 1990 all led to an increase in the 
prices  of  oil.  There  is  therefore,  a  concern 
that  the  Arab  Spring  would  continue  to 
spread to key oil exporting Gulf nations, with 
serious  implications  on  oil  production  and  18 
energy prices.  So far, the popular uprisings 
have been in the less oil-endowed countries.  
Only  Libya,  the  13
th  largest  oil  exporter, 
caused some minor fluctuations in the price 
of  oil.  However,  when  protests  in  Bahrain 
erupted, the EU and the US were complicit in 
allowing forces led by Saudi Arabia to enter 
Bahrain  to  quell  the  protests,  reflecting  the 
West’s concerns toward oil supply and prices. 
 
In  the  EU’s  2011-2013  financial  framework, 
the  ENP  is  only  getting  6  per  cent  of  the 
budget, €5.7 billion to be exact. To fulfil its 
potential  and  face  the  coming  economic 
challenges in the Mediterranean, the region 
needs  much  higher  investments.  The  High 
Representative  of  the  Union  for  Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton 
therefore called for an increase of €1 billion in 
the ceiling for the European Investment Bank 
(EIB),  the  organisation  that  funds  projects 
through which the objectives of the EU can be 
realized.  The  EIB,  through  the  Facility  for 
Euro-Mediterranean  Investment  and 
Partnership (FEMIP), is the largest investor in 
the  region.  Currently,  member  states  have 
agreed to an additional financial package of 
€1.242  billion.  According  to  many,  this 
amount is still not enough. They therefore call 
for the EU to increase its offer to the southern 
Mediterranean region which can come in the 
form  of  more  investments  and  financial 
assistance,  to  underpin  the  reforms  so  that 
desired stability and prosperity can return to 
the region (Sapir and Zachmann 2011).  
 
Regional balance of power 
 
The  Arab  Spring  is  also  likely  to  have  some 
consequences  for  the  regional  balance  of 
power in the Middle East and implications for 
the  Israeli-Palestinian  conflict.    Some of  the 
demands coming from the protestors include 
calls  for  a  more  independent  role  of  their 
countries in the international arena. The close 
ties of some of the regimes, such as those of 
Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak, to the West have 
not been viewed positively. The US policy in 
Middle East with its clear bias towards Israel 
was maintained through tacit US support for 
some  of  the  countries  ruled  by  Sunnis  who 
were  more  concerned  about  the  Iranian 
influence  and  their  hold  over  the  Shia 
communities  in  their  own  countries.  Egypt, 
the only country in the Middle East that has 
formally  recognised  Israel,  has  been  a 
significant  player  in  the  regional  balance  of 
power. With Hosni Mubarak gone, there are 
already emerging signs that Egypt’s relations 
with Israel might become more problematic. 
This would worry the Israel and the US and 
complicate  the  search  for  a  solution  to  the 
long-standing  Israeli-Palestinian  conflict.  The 
Israelis  are  also  feeling  internationally 
isolated  and  the  Palestinians,  sensing  this, 
have  threatened  to  unilaterally  declare 
independent  statehood.  A  submission  has 
been  made  to  the  UN  and  the  Security 
Council  will  begin  a  debate  on  whether  to 
welcome  the  Palestinian  Authority  as  a 
member state. 
 
In an interview, James Dorsey explained that 
the  biggest  change  towards  the  Israel-
Palestine  conflict  within  the  Mediterranean 
will  be  the  attitude  of  Egypt.  In  past  years, 
Egypt  has  collaborated  with  Israel.  Egypt 
closed its border in order to isolate Gaza, but 
soon  after  the  Arab  Spring  the  border  was 
reopened.  Egyptian  officials  explained  that 
they are moving towards policies that reflect 
the public opinion. Another change because 
of the Arab Spring is an agreement between 
Hamas  and  Fatah  which  was  signed  on  27 
April.  Many  agree  that  the  change  of  the 
Egyptian  government  to  be  less  willing  to 
enforce pro-Israel policies was an important 
contributing factor to this (Duss 2011).  
 
Many western diplomats and observers argue 
that  the  Arab  Spring  reinforces  the  urgency 
for  peace  talks  between  the  Israelis  and 
Palestinians  or  Israel  is  likely  to  see  itself 
more isolated. What role the EU can play in  19 
bringing  about  these  talks  is  unclear.  The 
strong relationship between Israel and the US, 
the  lack  of  interest of  Israel  toward  the  EU 
(even though the EU is part of the quartet) as 
a  negotiator  and  finally  the  fragmented 
nature of the EU policy towards the Middle 
East, stemming from the different opinions of 
the  EU  member  states  towards  the  Israel-
Palestinian conflict, has so far meant that the 
EU  has  not  been  a  significant  player  in 
offering any solutions to the conflict (Schulz 
2010: 4, 8, 10).  
 
John  Dugard,  a  South  African  professor  of 
international law and Special Rapporteur for 
both  the  International Law  Commission  and 
the  former  United  Nations  Commission  on 
Human Rights, in an interview, proposes that 
the EU can help in setting the agenda for the 
peace talks by first taking a tougher stand on 
Israel  with  regards  to  settlements  in  East 
Jerusalem  and  insisting  on  an  end  to 
settlement  building  in  the  disputed  areas. 
Secondly,  the  EU  should  support  the 
declaration  of  Palestine  as  an  independent 
state,  and  finally,  the  EU  should  end  the 
isolation of Hamas in Palestine as they have 
to  be  part  of  the  solution  to  the  Israeli-
Palestinian  conflict.    However,  Dugard  also 
opined in the interview that it is unlikely that 
the EU would take these three steps as the EU 
continues to allow the US to take the lead and 
tends to follow the broad direction set by the 
US with regards to this issue.  
 
Migration and refugees 
 
As  a  consequence  of  the  overthrow  of 
regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, and the civil war 
in Libya, the Arab Spring resulted in an exodus 
of  refugees  to  the  EU.  The  first  Tunisian 
refugees arrived on the island of Lampedusa, 
Italy on 16 February 2011. By 5 April, around 
25,000 asylum seekers had reached Italy and 
another  800  reached  Malta.  The  increased 
number  of  immigrants  led  to  a  fierce 
discussion in the EU about sharing the burden 
of  housing  these  immigrants  among  the 
member states.  
 
The  discussion  about  migration  flows  and 
refugees  to  the  EU  started  with  Umberto 
Bossi,  the  Italian  Minister  for  National 
Reform’s comment that immigrants should be 
spread across the EU instead of staying only 
in  Italy.
22 This proposal was not appreciated 
by several northern EU states (Denmark and 
Germany for instance) and particularly by the 
French,  who  only  wanted  to  support  Italy 
financially  in  dealing  with  the  flows  of 
migrants and refugees to Lampedusa. On 7 
April, Italy announced that it would provide 
the  Tunisian  migrants  with  a  temporary 
humanitarian visa
23 that would allow them to 
freely move around within the Schengen area. 
This  led  to  angry  reactions  from  other 
European countries, especially from Germany 
and France.  Countries such as Denmark also 
reintroduced border controls.  
 
The refugee issue led to a brief abrogation of 
the Schengen Agreement, which reflected the 
political sensitivities that many EU member 
states face with regards to accepting more 
                                                      
22 France,  Germany  and  the  Benelux  countries  signed  the 
Schengen Agreement in 1985. Individuals of these countries 
were  then  able  to  travel  freely  between  these  countries. 
Currently  the  Schengen  area  includes  25  countries  and 
Romania  and  Bulgaria  are  on  hold  With  the  Schengen 
Agreement, checks at internal borders between the signatory 
states are eliminated and there a single external border is 
created.  To  enter  the  Schengen  area,  identical  procedures 
are  implemented.  There  are  also  common  rules  on  visas, 
asylum and borders controls. Italy has taken more than the 
fair part of the North African migrants but overall it has fewer 
refugees  than  Austria,  Britain,  France,  Germany,  the 
Netherlands and Sweden.  
 
23 The decree of the President of the Council of Ministers 
(DPCM) adopted on 5 April 2011, provides for the issue of 
temporary residence permits for humanitarian reasons in 
favour of “citizens of North African countries” who arrived in 
Italy from 1 January 2011 to 5 April 2011. In a second DPCM, 
the  Italian  authorities  declared  ‘state  of  humanitarian 
emergency  in  the  territory  of  North  Africa  in  order  to 
effectively contrast the exceptional flow of migrants in the 
Italian territory’. 
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migrants  and  refugees  into  their  societies. 
Some  EU  member  states  proposed  a 
temporary return to national borders and the 
possibility of isolating any EU member state 
which  is  incapable  of  efficiently  managing 
incoming  migratory  flows.  Germany,  the 
Netherlands, Greece and Malta have already 
agreed  to  the  proposal  to  adjust  the 
Schengen  Agreement.  The  European 
Commission consequently proposed that only 
under  very  special  and  difficult  conditions 
such as the massive influx of illegal migrants 
could a Schengen signatory state reintroduce 
temporary border controls.  
 
Migration  control  is  a  regular  topic  in  EU-
Mediterranean  dialogue.  The  influx  of 
migrants  from  North  Africa  and  the  Middle 
East  will  remain  a  sensitive  issue  for  the 
future  EU-Mediterranean  partnership.  The 
proposal  by  the  Commission,  in  the 
‘Partnership  for  Democracy  and  Shared 
Prosperity’,  suggests  ‘gradual  steps  towards 
visa  liberalisation  for  individual  partner 
countries’  (European  Commission  2011:  200 
final 7). Although this perspective is helpful, it 
should  be  noted  that  when  Štefan  Füle, 
Commissioner  for  Neighbourhood  Policy, 
proposed some ideas on visa facilitation for 
the southern neighbour countries in 2010, he 
was  reprimanded by  several  member  states 
(Grant 2011: 8). Therefore the chances that 
member states will now agree to more liberal 
visa facilitation in the Mediterranean region 
are slim.  
 
Migration  has  become  such  a  politically 
sensitive  issue  linked  to  various  insecurities 
felt  by  the  populations  in  the  EU  member 
states  that  the  future  of  the  EU-
Mediterranean  partnership  would  likely 
continue  to  be  impacted  by  the  rising  anti-
migrant sentiments.  The exploitation of the 
fears of migrants to links to terrorism is not 
helped by a recent report by Europol (2011) 
expressing concern that the Arab Spring and 
the  economic  crisis  would  likely  lead  to 
increase  in  the  risk  of  terrorist  attacks  by 
fundamentalists in the EU. Organizations like 
the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 
and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 
have so far been only observers to the Arab 
Spring.  However,  the  Europol  report  on  EU 
Terrorism  Situation  and  Trend  Report 
concludes that ‘should Arab expectations [on 
the results of the Arab Spring] not be met, the 
consequence may be a surge in support for 
those terrorist organizations’. It also reported 
that  some  groups  might  take  advantage  of 
the temporary reduction of the control of the 
state  to  plot  their  attacks.  The  report  also 
warned  that  individuals  with  terrorist 
intentions could easily enter Europe amongst 
the  large  numbers  of  immigrants  (Rettman 
2011).  
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
Despite  the  unpredictability  of  the  current 
situation,  the  Arab  Spring  has  created  new 
political realities in the Mediterranean region 
which  the  EU  will  have  to  live  with  and 
respond to appropriately. 
 
Since the launch of the Barcelona Process in 
1995, the EU’s Mediterranean policy has been 
criticized  for  not  linking  financial  aid  to 
democratic reform, and for giving priority to 
European concerns like immigration, security, 
and  cooperation  on  counter-terrorism  over 
the  needs  of  its  partners  for  political  and 
economic reforms.  
 
The Arab Spring and the changes taking place 
in  the  region  have  given  the  EU  and  its 
Mediterranean  partners  the  opportunity  to 
review and restart their partnership. In doing 
so,  they  face  several  challenges  such  as 
uncertainties over the political transition and 
the sovereign debt crisis within the euro zone. 
Yet  the  fact  remains  that  the  southern  and 
eastern  Mediterranean  is  in  the  EU’s 
immediate  neighbourhood,  meaning  the  EU  21 
has no choice but to be concerned about the 
political developments and long term stability 
of the region.   
 
The Arab Spring is proving to be a significant 
test for the EU and its foreign policy. If the EU 
succeeds in setting a coherent policy for the 
region and concentrates on long term support 
to  foster  and  build  a  stable,  democratic 
environment,  it  could  profit  from  a  secure 
neighbourhood with great economic potential. 
The  proposal  for  the  Partnership  for 
Democracy and Shared Prosperity is a step in 
the  right  direction  but  the  EU  has  to  be 
mindful  of  the  pitfalls  of  this  model  of 
partnership  as  revealed  by  the  relatively 
lacklustre  achievements  of  its  long-standing 
EU-Mediterranean  engagement.  The  EU  has 
to  listen  more  closely  to  the  needs  and 
priorities  of  its  partners  and  broaden  its 
engagement  beyond  the  elite  level  to  the 
groups and communities in the societies of its 
partners. It should not have a one-size fits all 
approach,  and  instead  encourage  the 
individual  partners  to  present  their  own 
initiatives and tailor the policy to each partner 
appropriately.  More  importantly,  the  EU 
needs  to  ensure  that  its  policy  aims  are 
matched with adequate efforts and resources. 
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